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Abstract  
This study investigates the effect of bank competition, bank size, diversification and 
capitalization on risk taking behavior of commercial banks using panel data from Zambia. 
In addition, the study investigates the effect of capitalization and bank size on the bank 
competition-stability nexus. The empirical analysis is performed in two stages. In the first 
stage, time varying bank-specific Lerner Index is estimated. Then this measure of market 
power as well as other control variables are regressed on measures of bank soundness 
such as credit risk and overall stability (Z-Score and ZROE). Using a quarterly panel data 
of Zambian Banks covering the period Q1 2005 to Q4 2016, in general results from the 
study show that there is a positive relationship between market power and bank stability. 
In particular, results show that an increase in market power reduces a banks credit risk 
while it increases overall bank stability. These results are consistent with the 
‘concentration-stability’ hypothesis common in some empirical literature. Furthermore, 
bank size and capitalization are associated with improvement in bank stability while lack 
of income diversification reduces bank stability. Finally, results of this study also indicate 
that larger and well-capitalized banks with market power are more stable than smaller 
and less capitalized ones. 
 Policy implications for supervisory authorities in Zambia and other developing countries 
can be drawn from this study. First, there is need for supervisory authorities in Zambia to 
tread carefully with regard to enhancing competition in the banking sector as the results 
clearly indicate that it can have negative effects on financial stability. Secondly, results in 
this study render support to the use of stringent capital requirements under the Basel II 
and Basel III. Finally, it would be prudent for supervisory policies to include income 
diversification regulations thresholds among the commercial banks.  
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1.0 Introduction 
In the wake of the 2009-2010 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), issues pertaining to financial 
system stability have gained prominence among policymakers and academics. One key 
concern of policymakers and researchers has been to understand factors that affect 
financial system stability to guide policy formulation and implementation. In particular, 
scholars and policy makers have focused their efforts on the role that bank competition 
plays in financial system stability as well as bank specific factors, which could impact this 
relationship such as size, capitalization and liquidity.   
The impact of bank competition on financial system stability remains one of the most 
researched and discussed topics (Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013; Soedarmono, 
Machrouh, and Tarazi, 2013; Tabak, Fazio, Cajueiro, 2012; Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras, 
2011). However, so far both theoretical and empirical evidence provide contradicting 
conclusions. On one hand, the ‘competition-stability’ or ‘concentration-fragility’ view 
argues that enhanced bank competition improves financial system stability due to its 
effects on lowering lending rates thereby reducing probability of default and consequently 
systemic risk (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Tabak et al., 2012). In addition, higher loan 
rates may lead to moral hazard as borrowers increase their investment in risk projects 
with a view to enhance their ability to repay loans (Tabak et al., 2012). On the contrary, 
the ‘competition-fragility’ or the ‘concentration-stability’ view states that more bank 
concentration enhances financial system stability. This view argues that banks in 
concentrated markets earn higher profit margins, thereby creating a buffer from crisis and 
reducing their incentives to invest in risk assets (Tabak et al., 2012; Agoraki et al., 2011; 
Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000). Further, in a competitive market, managers are 
under pressure to make a return for their shareholders, which could prompt them to take 
in more risk assets in an effort to improve returns (Keeley, 1990; Tabak et al., 2012), may 
increase systemic risk.  Hence, any adverse shock to the system could trigger a chain 
reaction in which all banks exposed to the first risky bank may go bankrupt. This is 
because in a competitive market environment, all banks are price takers and hence 
relatively small in relation to the whole market, no bank would be willing to provide liquidity 
to a bank in trouble resulting in a contagion. Another argument in support of the 
‘concentration-stability’ view is that competitive markets worsens the adverse-selection 
problem, that is in the presence of many banks screening costs increases thereby 
enhancing the probability of bad borrowers obtaining credit and consequently decreasing 
loan portfolio quality (Broecker, 1990; Nakamura, 1993; Shaffer, 1998; Tabak et al., 
2012).     
Additionally, there has been an increased interest from academics and policymakers alike 
on the role that bank level factors such as bank size, capitalization and income 
diversification play in enhancing financial system stability. The interest in factors affecting 
financial system stability have become more pronounced in the wake of the GFC which 
gave rise to a new set of stringent financial regulations under the Basel III accord, 
especially for larger banks. Among other objectives, the Basel III places stringent 
regulations on systemically important banks, forcing them to use a larger fraction of their 
capital in operations with a view to reduce both the exposure to contagion and risk taking 
behavior (Tabak et al., 2012; Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2010). The main 
concern of bank regulators is the ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) syndrome among banks, because 
of larger banks’ perceived systemic importance. It is believed that larger banks are likely 
to expose themselves to greater risk taking activities because they believe that authorities 
are going to bail them (moral hazard) out thereby increasing financial system instability. 
Hence, empirical evidence on the determinants of financial system stability is of greater 
importance to policy makers as they implement the new regulations under the Basel III 
accord.   
The aim of this paper is to extend the literature on the bank competition-financial system 
stability nexus from the perspective of a developing economy. Specifically, it explores the 
relationship between financial system stability and bank competition as well as the role 
that bank specific factors play in this relationship. In addition, the study explores the role 
that the economic environment play in explaining financial system stability. 
A study on a developing country, such as Zambia, is important for many reasons. First, 
Zambia like many other developing undertook a number of economic and financial sector 
reforms under the sponsorship of Bretton-wood institutions with implications for 
competition. Specifically, Zambia liberalized its financial system by relaxing entry 
restrictions resulting in increased private sector participation and removal of interest rate 
controls with the aim of enhancing competition of the sector. Second, Zambia has had 
some episodes of extreme financial stress in the last two and half decades, among them 
is the collapse of nine banks in the period 1995 to 2001 and recently the placing under 
receivership of Intermarket Bank Corporation. These episodes of financial system 
instability entail the need for well-formulated supervisory policies and a regulatory regime 
based on comprehensive empirical research. Thirdly, Zambia and many other countries 
are required to implement the stringent measures under the Basel III accord. These 
measures include new regulations on bank capital and optimal liquidity requirements as 
well as enhanced regulations for systemically important banks. Finally, literature review 
revealed that there is no comprehensive study on factors affecting financial system 
stability, more so the role of bank competition on financial system stability.  
The structure of paper is as follows: section 2.0 provides review of theoretical and 
empirical evidence; section 3.0 provides an overview of Zambia’s financial sector; section 
4.0 provides a methodology, describing the variables and the empirical methodology 
employed; Section 5.0 gives and discusses empirical results; and section 6.0 provides 
concluding remarks and empirical evidence.   
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
Theoretical literature provides contrasting predictions regarding the relationship between 
bank competition and financial stability. These contrasting theoretical views belong to two 
categories, namely; i) the traditional ‘franchise-value hypotheses or ‘competition-fragility’ 
view; and ii) the ‘concentration-fragility’ view.  
 The traditional ‘charter-value’ hypothesis, first proposed by Keeley (1990), suggests that 
increased competition among banks makes them more prone to risk taking thereby 
increasing their vulnerability. Specifically, the ‘charter value hypothesis’ argues that banks 
with greater market power have higher charter values because of the monopoly profits 
that they are able to earn (Atkins, Li, and Rusticus, 2016).  Increased charter values from 
monopoly profits deter banks from risk-taking behavior and consequently lower the 
probability of bank failure. In other words, increased competition erodes charter values of 
banks, which, in turn forces them to take on risky assets to maintain the franchise value 
(Hellmann et al., 2000; Allen and Gale, 2000; Keeley, 1990). Apart from the charter value 
channel, greater competition leads to greater fragility through other channels. One such 
channel is the effect that competition has on bank supervision, which, is often presented 
through the idea that concentrated banking systems are easier to supervise resulting in 
more stability (Allen and Gale, 2004; Beck, 2008). Another channel occurs through the 
relationship between bank competition and payment systems proposed by Saez and shi 
(2004). According to this channel, excessive competition can deplete excess liquidity in 
the banking sector such that in the period of a shock the potential for pooling interbank 
liquidity is undermined leading to reduced stability. Finally, the third channel occurs 
through the negative effect that competition has on portfolio diversification. Specifically, 
banks when faced with increased competition tend to invest in similar high yielding assets 
with a view to protect their charter values. Mishkin (1999) develops a theoretical model, 
which shows that higher market share allows for better risk diversification in loan portfolio, 
which helps to mitigate bank losses in periods of economic downturns.  
In recent years, the traditional ‘charter value hypothesis’ or ‘competition-fragility’ view has 
been challenged by the ‘competition-stability’ view, which states that increased market 
power can reduce banks’ stability (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). According to this view, 
increased market power increases the probability of bank failure because of risk shifting 
process due to the presence of informational asymmetry problems: moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) develops  a theoretical model which shows 
that lack of competition can easily result in moral hazard and adverse selection, which, in 
turn can reduce banks’ loan portfolio quality. Specifically, higher interest rates charged by 
banks enjoying monopoly power can negatively influence the quality of agents accessing 
loans (by increasing the share of agents with bad record of repayment-adverse selection) 
thereby increasing non-performing loans. Further, higher loan rates can cause borrowers 
to engage in riskier ventures that have higher returns for them to cover the high cost of 
borrowing (moral harzard). A model developed by Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) show 
that price competition among banks leads to lower interests and hence the level of 
investments that consequently improves economic performance and reduces the 
probability of default. Others have also argued that concentrated banking systems are 
likely to be unstable due to regulatory inertia. One part of this theory mentions “too-big-
to-fall” (TBTF) policy as the reason explaining ‘concentration-fragility’ hypothesis. The 
reason behind the TBTF hypothesis that regulators are likely to help systemically 
important banks in order to limit the effects of a shock. However, since larger banks know 
that they are likely to be bailed out by authorities are more prone to risk taking which 
makes the system less stable. Furthermore, the idea of saving with systemically important 
banks can also influence depositors of a bank to become less interested in monitoring the 
bank they save with (Mishkin, 1999; Beck, 2008). Finally, those in support of the 
‘competition-stability’ hypothesis argue that concentrated banking systems are more 
difficult to monitor and regulate because a large proportion of these banks engage in more 
complex products, which are often difficult for regulators to monitor (Beck et al., 2006). 
2.2 Empirical Literature 
There are three categories of empirical literature on the role of bank competition on 
financial system stability. First, most early studies supported the ‘concentration-stability’ 
or the ‘franchise-value’ view (Broecker, 1990; Keeley, 1990, Agoraki, Delis and 
Pasiouras, 2011).  Another category of studies support the ‘concentration-fragility’ 
hypothesis (Boyd, De Nicolo and Jalal, 2006; Soerdarmono et al., 2013; Schaeck et al., 
2009). Lastly, the latest set of studies seem to suggest that there is non-linearity in the 
relationship between bank competition and financial stability (Berger et al., 2009; Tabak 
et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2013). In particular, banking systems that are more competitive 
or more concentrated tend to be more stable than those with average levels of competition 
are. 
Empirical evidence from studies in the period prior to the 2000s are mostly in support of 
the ‘concentration-stability’ or ‘charter-value’ hypothesis. Specifically, using USA data 
Brocker (1990) finds evidence in support of the ‘concentration-stability’ hypothesis by 
finding a negative relationship between number of banks and average banks’ credit 
quality. A study by Keeley (1990) provides further evidence by showing that increased 
competition in the US banking industry following deregulation eroded bank charter values 
thereby making banks to take more risk. Finally, a recent study by Agoraki et al. (2011) 
using a bank-level panel data of Central and Eastern European countries utilizing the 
Lerner Index as measure of bank competition and non-performing loans (NPLs) as well 
as Z-score as measures of bank risk taking finds evidence in support of the ‘charter-value’ 
hypothesis. Specifically, they find that there is a significant negative relationship between 
NPLs and the Lerner Index implying that an increase in market power reduces bank risk 
taking behavior. In addition, they find that bank capital, stringent regulations, bank size 
and favorable economic performance reduces bank risk-taking behavior. Using the Z-
score, the study finds a positive significant relationship with market power implying 
concentrated market systems are associated with stable banking systems.  
In a study of the US cross-sectional data and an international panel data of Banks, Boyd 
et al. (2006) finds evidence in support of the ‘competition-stability’ hypothesis. 
Specifically, their results show that a higher degree of bank competition is associated with 
improved financial system stability. Further, their study provide evidence to suggest that 
bank competition is associated with higher willingness to lend. However, the only 
drawback of this study is that it uses Hirschman-Herfindarl Index (HHI) that ignores firm 
behavior in determining profitability.  
Using duration and logit analysis using a bank-level cross-sectional data from 45 
countries, Schaeck et al. (2009) also find evidence in support of the ‘Competition-stability’ 
hypothesis. Specifically, they find that competition (measured by H-statistic) reduces the 
likelihood of a crisis and increases time to crisis thereby rejecting the notion that 
competitive banking systems are susceptible to systemic risk. The findings are still 
significant with correct sign even after incorporating a measure of concentration indicating 
that concentration is not a correct measure of competition. In addition, they find that real 
interest rates, poor terms of trade and inflation reduces the survival time of banks while 
economic growth improves soundness of the financial system. 
Occurrence of financial crisis may also affect the competition-stability nexus. A study by 
Soedarmono et al. (2013) investigates the role that financial crises play in modifying bank 
competition and consequently bank risk taking behavior. The study uses bank-level panel 
data from 11 Asian countries with Lerner Index as measure of market power while they 
use standard deviations of return on equity and Assets as measures of risk taking while 
bank insolvency is measured by Z-scores. The results indicate that market power has 
positive effect on banks volatility measures indicating that market power increases bank 
risk taking behavior. In addition, market power to have positive effect on bank insolvency. 
Finally, they find that although a higher Lerner index reduces bank ratios it had no 
destabilizing effects on financial stability during the 1997-1999 Asian financial crisis. 
Specifically, higher market power in banking has a negative impact on risk taking and 
positive impact on bank solvency. Hence, they conclude that higher degree of market 
power is associated with financial system instability but the opposite is true during a 
financial crisis.   
A study by Berger et al. (2009), undertakes a test of the opposing views of ‘concentration-
stability’ and ‘concentration-fragility’ using firm level data from 30 developed countries. 
Their results support both views. Specifically, they find that banks with higher degree of 
market power bear more loan risk portfolio in support of the ‘concentration-fragility’ 
hypothesis as well as that Banks with more market power enjoy less overall risk exposure 
that is in support of the ‘concentration-stability’ view.  In addition, they find that larger 
banks carry significantly less non-performing loans while foreign owned banks are more 
fragile. Furthermore, better economic performance is associated with less bank fragility.  
Similar to Berger et al. (2009), Tabak et al. (2012) tests evidence of ‘Competition-Stability’ 
and ‘Competition-fragility’ views as well as the role bank size and capitalization play in 
this relationship using bank-specific panel data from 10 Latin American countries. Using 
a Boone Index as a measure of competition, they find that Banks operating under high 
and low competition level are less fragile than under average competition. In addition, 
results that higher loan loss provision increases bank stability while bank capitalization 
has the opposite effect. Further, they find that bank liquidity and size improves financial 
system stability. Hence, they conclude that there is non-linearity effect of competition on 
risk taking behavior.  
Beck et al. (2013) investigates the role country specific factor play in explaining the 
competition-stability nexus. Using a panel data of US banks, results indicate that there is 
significant positive relationship the Lerner index and bank soundness indicators. That is 
an increase in bank competition increases banks’ risk taking behavior and consequently 
undermining financial system stability. Similar to Berger et al. (2009), they find that credit 
risk and non-interest income improves bank stability. More importantly, they find that 
higher bank competition is more harmful to stability in countries where i) information 
sharing systems are effective, ii) stock market are liquid, iii) deposit insurance is more 
generous, and iv) stricter financial regulations. Hence, they conclude that country level 
factors may help to explain the contradicting effects of competition on financial stability.  
3.0 Stylized facts about Zambia’s banking sector 
Prior to 1990, Zambia’s financial sector consisted of only three local private banks with 
minimal market share. Foreign and government owned banks dominated the banking 
sector taking up a larger share of the market. However, economic liberalization reforms 
undertaken by government with the support of Bretton-wood institutions included a 
package of financial sector reforms. As part of the reforms, it was recognized that a well-
functioning and competitive banking system was cardinal for the overall development of 
the country (Simpasa, 2013). Accordingly, Zambia liberalized its financial system by 
relaxing entry restrictions resulting in increased private sector participation and removal 
of interest rate controls with the aim of enhancing competition as well as fostering 
efficiency in the sector.  
Following removal of entry restriction, the structure of Zambia’s financial sector 
significantly changed. The early years of financial sector reforms saw a progressive entry 
of new banks in the sector reaching 19 in 1995 from only 12 banks in 1989 (Brownridge, 
1996). However, this positive result was reversed during the mid-1990s banking crisis, 
which saw the collapse of more than 8 banks (Simpasa, Nandwa, and Nabassaga, 2014). 
The banking sector crisis of the mid-1990s created a scope for more prudential reforms 
that resulted in a more robust regulatory framework (GRZ, 2004; Simpasa et al., 2014).  
Another result of financial reforms of the early 1990s was the entry of new foreign owned 
banks into the banking sector. As at the end of 2012, there were a total of 13 foreign-
owned banks, four privately owned banks, and 2 banks with a government stake. In an 
effort to improve efficiency, the Government of the Republic of Zambia partially privatised 
the Zambia National Commercial Bank, the largest domestic bank, through offering a 
stake to a foreign bank (Rabobank) and offloading part of its shareholding on the Lusaka 
Stock Exchange to the private sector. Although government and other Zambian 
shareholders have a majority stake in the bank, management rights are with foreign 
shareholders (45%). In totality, there are 19 commercial banks operating in Zambia with 
a combined asset size equivalent to 30% of GDP (Simpasa et al., 2014). 
Although there has been an increase in the number of commercial banks in Zambia’s 
banking sector, it remains highly concentrated. The 4-firm concentration, a basic measure 
of market structure indicates that Zambia’s banking sector is not competitive as it shows 
that four largest banks control nearly two-thirds of all market segments (see Table 1 
below). In addition, nearly all the four banks have a foreign ownership stake in them. This 
state of affairs poses a danger to the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission in 
three important ways. Firstly, foreign ownership not only exposes the financial sector to 
external shocks facing parent companies but also these banks can use liquidity from 
parent banks to circumvent tight monetary policy in the host economy and hence render 
monetary policy ineffective. Secondly, high levels of concentration in the banking sector 
could undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy through sluggishness in the 
adjustments of interest rates in response to changes in monetary policy (Couttareli and 
Kourelis, 1994; Massarongo, 2012). Finally, most foreign banks may have policies 
regarding credit extension, which is dependent on the policies in foreign countries 
(Simpasa et al., 2014). 
 
Table 1: 4-Firm Concentration Ratio Since 1998 
  1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2016 
Loans 80.9 78.3 76.2 75.5 73.6 75.7 62.9 66.4 65.6 62.6 62.3 61.7 
Deposits 75.5 78.0 74.9 73.8 66.9 67.3 65.7 61.7 60.2 57.9 60.1 59.8 
Assets 77.8 74.7 64 70.8 63.5 67.3 62.9 61.5 57.9 55.5 57.0 58.1 
Bonds and 
Securities 58.9 58.6 69.8 71.5 60.7 62.2 64.9 66.7 62.1 54.8 59.8 60.1 
Source: Computations by Author Using BOZ Database, 1998-2016 
 
Since 1998, a reflection in the level of competition has been most evident in the loans 
segment followed by the deposits while the assets segment and Bond/securities segment 
has remained static over the last ten years. Similarly, banking activities have increased 
over time, as depicted by the composition of the banks’ consolidated balance sheet (see 
Table 1 above). Furthermore, there has been an increase in the banking activities in the 
country as indicated by the consolidated balance sheet which has shown that the level of 
assets and liabilities have increased from only 1.5 billion kwacha in 1998 to over 49.6 
billion in 2014 (See Table 2 below). 
Table 2: Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Commercial Banks in Zambia 
 
Source: Computations by Author Using BOZ Database, 1998-2014 
Over the review period, the commercial banks have increased the share of liquid assets 
(notes and coins, deposits at the Central Bank and holding of securities), although they 
showed a decline in 2012 and replaced by loans. Specifically, as at the end of 1998 liquid 
assets accounted for slightly less than 21% of the banking system’s total assets against 
approximately 34% in loans. By the end of 2010, the share of liquid assets in total assets 
had reached 43.1% while the total loans and advances accounted for 38%. However, by 
the end of 2012 the share of liquid assets dropped to 36% while loans and advances grew 
to 47.1%. At end 2015, total loans and advances fell to 43.7%. The rebound in the share 
of loans follows banks’ increased exposure to the private sector following marked 
improvements in macroeconomic performance, underpinned by low inflation and strong 
economic growth, especially after the 2007-2010 global economic crisis (Simpasa et al., 
2014). Although there has been a sustained increase in the level of credit extended to the 
private sector, it remains low even by regional standards. The increase in credit extended 
to the private sector could be due to a fall in yield rates on government securities.  
In terms of foreign assets, Table 2 shows that before 2006 commercial banks acquired 
large amounts of foreign assets to hedge against high inflation and a rapidly depreciating 
domestic currency. However, as conditions have improved, the proportion of claims on 
k' mn Share k' mn Share k' mn Share k' mn Share k' mn Share k' mn Share
Liquid Assets 308.5      20.8   1,752.3  37.5    4,491.3    42.1    10,446.7   43.1    12,759.9  36.1   21,762.1 43.9   
Total Loans 499.8      33.7   947.7     20.3    3,866.6    36.2    9,219.4     38.0    16,667.4  47.1   21,665.0 43.7   
Foreign Assets 445.0      30.0   1,226.4  26.2    1,718.4    16.1    2,426.0     10.0    4,440.2    12.5   6,952.0   14.0   
Other assets 230.0      15.5   723.0     15.5    598.9       5.6      2,150.2     8.9      1,512.7    4.3     2,275.4   4.6     
Deposits 1,006.0   67.8   3,257.5  69.7    7,886.5    73.9    17,296.6   71.3    25,214.3  71.3   34,942.5 70.4   
Other Borrowed Funds 15.0        1.0     59.8       1.3      150.5       1.4      540.2        2.2      931.7       2.6     1,176.0   2.4     
Foreign Funds 40.0        2.7     96.5       2.1      673.0       6.3      2,339.9     9.7      310.8       0.9     1,997.7   4.0     
Shareholder Capital 161.0      10.9   573.7     12.3    1,029.3    9.6      2,208.4     9.1      3,960.5    11.2   7,273.9   14.7   
Others 261.0      17.6   688.8     14.7    935.9       8.8      1,857.4     7.7      4,962.9    14.0   3,606.2   7.3     
Assets=Liabilities 1,483.0   100.0 4,676.3  100.0  10,675.2  100.0  24,242.4   100.0  35,380.2  100.0 49,602.6 100.0 
LIABILITIES
1998 2002 2006 2010 2012 2014
foreign financial institutions in total assets by Zambian banks has significantly decreased, 
reaching 16% in 2006 and then 10% in 2010 and then edging slightly upwards to 12.5% 
in 2012.  
On the liabilities side, deposits account for more than two-thirds of the banks’ sources of 
funds. Although the bulk of deposits are attributed to the private sector, some large banks 
also hold substantial amounts of government deposits, which provide a buffer against 
swings in private sector deposits. On the other hand, shareholders’ capital has remained 
relatively stable over the years, roughly around 9-10% of total liabilities. This level of 
capitalisation reflects the robustness of the regulatory framework instituted in the 
aftermath of systemic bank failures in the mid-1990s. 
In the continued effort to strengthen the banking sector and improve its resilience to 
external shocks, the Bank of Zambia (BoZ) increased regulatory capital further in April 
2012 and introduced a tiered structure (GRZ, 2012). The minimum capital requirement 
for local banks was set at K104 billion (US$20 million) while that for foreign banks was 
set at K520 billion (US$100 million). Before the revision, minimum capital for all banks 
was K12 billion (approximately US$2 million). It was expected that the new capital 
requirement would attract additional resources into the industry and encourage lending 
to the private sector. 
4.0 Methodology 
4.1 Econometric model and estimation strategy  
In this study, to examine the relationship between risk taking behavior and competition, 
the model to be estimated include bank specific factors and business cycle variables from 
the various studies reviewed in the literature ( Beck et al., 2006; Tabak et al., 2012; 
Kasman and Kasman, 2015; Berger et al. 2009; Soedarmono et al., 2013). In this regard, 
the general model used in this paper is given by: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡, 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡) … … 1 
In the above model subscripts 𝑖 and t refers to bank and quarter, respectively. The model 
sets the relationship between bank risk and competition, controlling for bank specific 
variables and macroeconomic variables. Further, to investigate the effect of size and 
capitalization on the relationship between bank competition and Risk variables interaction 
terms between these variables and measures of market are introduced. Specifically, the 
following model is estimated:  
  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝐸𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ 𝑣 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … 2 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 refers to credit risk or Z-score/ZROE, which are measures of credit risk and bank-
stability, respectively. On the other hand, LI represents the Lerner Index, which is our 
measure of bank competition. The method used to estimate the measures of bank risk 
(credit and overall bank risk) as well as market power are discussed in section 4.2.  
Furthermore,  𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of bank specific variables such as a measure of 
size (log of total assets), capitalization (ratio of bank capital to total assets), and a 
measure of diversification (ratio of non-interest income to total income). Finally, 𝐸𝑗𝑖𝑡  
represents economic environment variables among them is inflation, price of copper, 
lending rate and level of real GDP. Economic variables are included to take into account 
the effects of business cycle environment. In addition, the first lag of the dependent 
variable is added to take care of persistence in bank risk. 
An important aspect in panel data analysis is the choice between fixed and random effects 
model. Fixed effects models assume that the unobserved individual effects are correlated 
with the variables included in the model while the random effects model does not 
(Hansen, 2002:135). This is because a choice of either fixed or random effect model has 
its own limitations. For example, Greene (2012:301) notes that fixed effects model is 
costly because it leads to loss of degrees of freedom compared to the random effects 
model. However, the fixed effects model has one important advantage over the random 
effects model. This is because there is little justification in treating the unobserved 
individual effects to be uncorrelated with the other variables as in the random effects and 
hence, the random effects may suffer from inconsistency due to this correlation. Hence, 
to decide on which of the approach to use the Hausman’s Specification test is used.  
 4.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
Bank-specific data for this study is obtained from the Bank of Zambia database of 
prudential returns submitted monthly by all commercial banks undertaking their 
operations in Zambia for the period Q1 2005 to Q4 2016. The prudential returns include 
income statements and balance sheets of all the 19 commercial banks operating. Banks 
also categorized as domestic and foreign ownership because in Zambia capital 
requirements are different between the two ownership types. In Zambia, there are 14 
foreign owned banks and 5 domestic banks. Furthermore, data on domestic economic 
environmental variables are obtained from the central statistical office (CSO) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) database.  The descriptive characteristics of the 
variables are presented in table 3 below: 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables 
Variable Definition Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Variables in the Translog Equation 
TA Total Assets (in K’ millions)  1,731,511.00 
 
 945,075.00 
 
 2,113,501.00 
 
TC Total Costs (in K’ millions)  47,662.40 
 
 22,822.50 
 
 58,086.33 
 
wl Price of Labour  0.013040 
 
 0.011161 
 
 0.010739 
 
Wf Price of borrowed funds  0.036288 
 
 0.019026 
 
 0.052365 
 
wk Price of Capital  0.545222 
 
0.389562 
 
 0.491119 
 
RISK Ratio of Non-Performing Loans to gross 
Loans 
 0.090708 
 
 0.062385 
 
 0.103163 
 
Variables in the Bank Stability and Credit Risk Equations 
Independent Variables in the Bank Soundness Equations 
Business_model Ratio of Non-Interest Income to total Income 0.35024 0.350937 0.193679 
TA Total Assets (in K’ millions) 1,731,511.00 
 
 945,075.00 
 
2,113,501.00 
 
Capitalization Ratio of Bank Capital to total assets 0.152958 0.115231 0.117069 
Adj_Lerner Estimated Bank Specific Lerner index  0.284938 0.446105 1.931672 
GDP Quarterly Real GDP in billions 30914.24 30826.8 13001.09 
ALR Average Lending Rate 24.41566 25.2 5.247323 
Cop Copper prices in US dollars 6621.498 7069.2 1570.08 
Exchange Rate Nominal Exchange Rate (ZMW/USD) 5.711169 5.031867 2.081713 
Inf Annual Inflation  8.820737 
 
 7.658451 
 
 2.923791 
 
Dependent Variables in the Bank Soundness Equations 
Z-score Z-score based on  ROA from a four-quarter 
period rolling window 53.46353 34.45018 66.56441 
Z_ROE Z-score based on  ROE from a four-quarter 
period rolling window 50.46318 33.05339 53.32519 
NPL_ratio Ratio of Non-Performing Loans to gross 
loans 0.091055 0.062621 0.103208 
SDROA Standard deviation of ROA for four-quarter 
period rolling window 0.007396 0.004105 0.013396 
Source: Computations by the Author 
4.2.1 Measures of bank competition 
In this study, bank competition is proxied by the Lerner index, which is commonly used in 
banking research, as a measure of competition or market power. The Lerner Index 
captures the ability of a firm to charge the price above marginal cost as percentage of the 
price and ranges between 0 and 1. In case of perfect competition, the Lerner Index is 0 
while it is 1 in pure monopoly. The Bank specific time-variant Lerner Index is as follows: 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡
… … … … … 3 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the price of the bank 𝑖′𝑠 output and 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the marginal cost. We computed 
 𝑃𝑖𝑡, as the ratio of the total operating income (interest and non-interest revenues) to the 
total assets.  
The Lerner Index as specified in equation 1 above assumes implicitly both profit and cost 
efficiency and fails to consider that banks may fail to exploit pricing opportunities arising 
from their market power (Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk, 2012; Kasman and Kasman, 2015; 
Clerides, Delis, and Kokas, 2013). Hence they argue that the traditional Lerner Index does 
not correctly measure the true market power. In this regard, they suggest an efficient 
adjusted Lerner Index which is specified as follows: 
   
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 =
𝜋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑡 + −𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝜋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑡
… … … … … 4 
To estimate the time-variant bank specific marginal cost, the study utilises and adapts a 
method employed by Simpasa (2013) as well as Chileshe and Akanbi (2016). The method 
uses an estimate of a trans-log cost function estimated with three inputs, namely; labour, 
fixed assets and borrowed funds and one-output (total assets). Specifically, the translog 
function estimated is as follows:  
ln 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗𝑖𝑡
3
𝑗=1
+
1
2
[𝛼𝑦𝑦(𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡)
2 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑚𝑖𝑡
3
𝑚=1
3
𝑗=1
]
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑌𝐽
3
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 … … … … … 5 
Where TC is total cost, Y is output (total assets), and W is a vector of input prices (price 
of labour, price of borrowed funds and price of physical capital)2. V represents the 
standard noise and u captures the inefficiency. Further, following in Turk-Ariss (2010) as 
well as Kasman and Kasman (2015) the total costs and prices of funds as well as labor 
are scaled by the price of physical capital to reduce the likelihood of heteroscedasticity. 
An important aspect in estimating panel data models as one above is the choice between 
random and fixed effects model. In order to choose the correct approach the Haussman 
test is utilized.  
To obtain the time-variant bank specific marginal cost, equation 3 is differentiated with 
respect to Y: 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 =
𝜕𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑖𝑡
=
𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑖𝑡
[𝛽1 + 𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑦𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑗𝑖𝑡
2
𝑗=1
] … … … … 6 
Using the MC equation above and the price of output (approximated by total operating 
income divided by total assets), the bank specific-time varying Lerner Index given in 
formulas in equations 3 and 4 is estimated.  
                                                          
2 The price of labour is calculated as the ratio between personnel expenses and total assets; price of physical assets 
measured as ratio of total non-labour costs to fixed assets while the price of borrowed funds is calculated as a ratio of 
total interest expenses to total borrowed funds. 
The results for the translog function in equation 5 are reported in table 4 below. The 
results reported in table 4 below present reasonable parameter estimates, with 
normalised input prices and scale variables carrying the expected signs significant at the 
1% level of significance. In addition, to take care of the cost consequences of non-
performing loans on a banks’ books it is added as one of the independent variables; RISK 
has the expected significant sign. Estimates of average Lerner index tracks to the 
Hirschman-Herfindarl Index (HHI) (see figure 1 below). 
Figure 1: Evolution of the HHI and Lerner Index 
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Table 4: Fixed effects estimation of the Translog Total Cost Function 
Dependent Variable: 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐶) 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Statistic P-Value 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 1.12482 1.81278 0.0703* 
𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝑨) 1.09405 
 
13.27394 
 
0.0000*** 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝒘𝒍) 0.80436 
 
12.90145 0.0000*** 
𝒍𝒏(𝒘𝒇) 0.23855 
 
3.94587 
 
0.0001*** 
 
𝟏
𝟐
(𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝑨))^𝟐 
-0.02029 
 
-2.74425 
 
0.0062*** 
 
𝟏
𝟐
(𝒍𝒏(𝒘𝒍))^𝟐 
0.09498 
 
3.35495 
 
0.0008*** 
 
𝟏
𝟐
(𝒍𝒏(𝒘𝒇))^𝟐 
0.02728 
 
4.34250 
 
0.0000*** 
 
𝟏
𝟐
𝒍𝒏(𝒘𝒇) ∗ 𝒍𝒏(𝒘𝒍) 
-0.01671 
 
-0.93912 
 
0.3480 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝑨) ∗ 𝒍𝒏(𝒘𝒍) -0.00615 
 
-5.06021 
  
0.0000*** 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝑨) ∗ 𝒍𝒏(𝒘𝒍) 0.038001 
 
7.43584 
 
0.0000*** 
 
𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 0.26273 
 
5.36747 
 
0.0000*** 
 
Diagnostics 
No Cross-sections No. of Observations Weighted R^2  P-value 
19 788 0.987 0.0000*** 
Haussmann’s Test Results: 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 58.394 ; 𝑃 − 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000 ∗∗∗ 
 
Source: Computations by the Author: Significance Level: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   
4.2.2 Bank Stability Measures 
Regarding bank stability, this study uses two different measures of risk exposure 
indicators are utilized as dependent variables to proxy credit risk and bank stability.  
Specifically, the volume of non-performing loans as ratio of total loans (NPLs) is used as 
a measure of credit risk while the Z-score is used as a measure of bank stability. The Z-
score is a widely used measure of bank stability in the literature and it measures the 
number of standard deviations by which bank returns would have to fall from average to 
deplete equity capital (Kasman and Kasman, 2015). In other words, how many standard 
deviations in return on assets a bank is from insolvency. The Z-score is computed as 
follows: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡
… … … … 5 
Where ROA is return on assets, E/TA is the equity to total asset ratio, and 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the 
standard deviation of the return on assets. In this study, a four-quarter rolling time window 
is used to compute the standard deviation to allow for time variation in the denominator 
of the Z-score. A higher Z-score imply a lower probability of insolvency and vice-versa, 
thereby providing a more direct measure of soundness compared to other measures. As 
already stated, the study also uses the Z-score based on the average return on equity 
(ZROE) to capture bank insolvency risk.  
𝑍𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =
1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐸)𝑖𝑡
… … … 6 
Where 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 is bank 𝑖 return on equity at time 𝑡 while the  
Credit risk is another major source of banking system risk. Available literature has shown 
that there is a positive relationship between bank’s credit risk and NPLs. In this regard, if 
a rise in NPLs is not controlled it can lead to banking failure with devastating implications 
on the economy, especially for systemically important banks. Hence, NPL is an important 
prudential indicator that should be watched by regulators in evaluating banking system 
stability. In this regard, this study also uses NPL ratio as a measure bank credit. In this 
study, credit risk is measured by: 
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 =
𝑁𝑃𝐿_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝑁𝑃𝐿_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
 
This transformation is used to change the variable’s support from the unit interval to the 
real number line. 
5.0 Empirical results and discussions 
In this section, attention is turned to discussing the effect of bank competition on risk 
taking behavior among banks as well as determining how bank size and capitalization 
changes this relationship. Available literature suggests that larger banks in concentrated 
markets have higher profit margins, which is why these banks may appear to have sound 
balance sheets (Hellman et al., 2000; Allen and Gale, 2000; Agoraki et al., 2011). In 
addition, under competition large banks and those with higher capitalization maybe 
pressured by their shareholders to take on more risk to ensure a higher return.   
5.1 Credit risk and bank competition 
In our analysis credit risk, is proxied by the Non-Performing Loans Ratio (NPL). Literature 
has shown that one key source of financial system risk is the size of non-performing loans 
in the Banking sector (Agoraki et al., 2011). Table 3 below presents the results with Non-
Performing Loans as a dependent variable. Results presented in table 3 three are 
reasonable and consistent with theoretical and empirical literature. Results of the 
Haussman test suggest that the fixed effects approach is used. 
Results reported in table 5 below, show that the coefficient of the linear term is negative 
while that of the quadratic term is positive and significant at 1% and 5% respectively. This 
result is consistent with U-sharp pattern (Agoraki et al., 2011; Tabak et al., 2012), which 
suggests that an increase in market power leads to a decline in credit risk, consistent with 
the ‘concentration-stability’ hypothesis, but only up to a certain level. After this threshold, 
an increase in market power leads to an increase in credit risk in line with the 
‘concentration-fragility’ hypothesis as suggested by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005).  
In addition, table 5 shows that bank size and the level of capitalization has significant 
negative effect on non-performing ratio or credit risk as expected. The negative 
association between size and credit risk is in line with literature, which suggests that 
portfolio diversification and possibly better risk management skills at larger banks play a 
better role in mitigating credit risk (Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina, 2010). This is confirmed 
by the positive effect of lower diversification on credit risk. In addition, the positive effect 
of bank capitalization in mitigating credit risk could be explained by the fact that bank 
capital is a risk averse source of funding compared to liabilities.  
With regard to business cycle variables, table 5 shows that higher copper prices on the 
international market has a negative association with domestic credit risk while higher 
lending rates have the opposite effect, significant at 5% and 10% respectively. The 
positive effect that the level of copper prices has on credit risk is expected in the sense 
that Zambia’s economic performance is highly dependent on the extraction and 
exportation of copper. Hence, higher copper prices are associated with better economic 
performance thereby improving the ability of borrowers to service their loans. The positive 
association between lending rates and credit risk maybe due to the burden that higher 
interest rates place on borrowers thereby making it hard for them to service their debt. 
However, economic performance and inflation was found to have the correct sign but 
insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Credit Risk, Bank Competition, Size, Capitalisation and Economic Environment 
Dependent Variable: 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 (
𝑁𝑃𝐿_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
1−𝑁𝑃𝐿_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
) 
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
T-Statistic P-Value 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 0.06417 
  
2.10371 
  
0.0357** 
  
𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌(−𝟏) 0.82084 
 
32.74077 
 
0.0000*** 
 
𝑳𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒓 -0.04481 
  
-2.58317 
  
0.0100** 
  
𝑳𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒓𝟐 0.00146 
  
2.31927 
 
0.0207** 
 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 -0.10515 
  
-4.19232 
  
0.0000*** 
 
𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 -0.03929 
 
-2.27529 
 
0.0232** 
 
𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
0.00454 
 
1.75744 
 
0.0793* 
 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑮𝑫𝑷) -0.00276 
 
-1.58900 0.1125 
𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 0.00854 
 
1.76880 0.0703* 
Inflation 0.00732 
 
-1.06996 0.2850 
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓) -0.00392 
 
-2.013881 
 
0.0444* 
 
 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 ∗ 𝑳𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒓 0.01444 
 
4.88307 0.0000*** 
𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑳𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒓 0.00934 
 
2.050411 
 
0.0407** 
 
Diagnostics 
No Cross-sections No. of 
Observations 
Weighted R_Square P-value 
19 769 0.887 0.0000*** 
Durbin Watson Test Statistic 2.065 
Haussmann’s Test Results: 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 34.894 ; 𝑃 − 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000 ∗∗∗ 
 
Source: Computations by the Author: Significance Level: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   
Finally, to investigate the role size and bank capitalization play in the bank competition-
credit risk nexus, our model includes interactions of the Lerner Index and measures of 
size and capitalization. The interaction terms of both size and capitalization with the 
Lerner Index are positive implying that an increase in both size and capital reduces the 
effect of market power on credit risk.  In other words, as bank size increases the effect of 
a banks’ market power on credit risk reduces. This effect is similar to bank capitalization. 
This finding imply that the positive effect bank market power on financial system stability 
diminishes as the size of the bank increases and bank capital rises. 
5.1 Overall bank stability and bank competition 
In this sub-section, results of the effect bank competition on overall bank stability. Table 
6 below, show estimations of equation 1 in which two measures of overall bank stability 
(Z-Score and ZROE) are regressed against a series of explanatory variables. A positive 
coefficient imply that the variable in question helps to improve a banks’ overall stability or 
it is directly proportional to overall bank stability. On the other hand, a negative coefficient 
imply that the variable in question is inversely proportional to bank stability. Before 
estimating the econometric models using panel data, it is important to test for fixed or 
random effects. Results of the Haussmann test in table 6 indicate that random effects 
model is rejected in favor of the fixed effects model.   
The results in table 6 below indicate that there is significant positive relationship between 
the Lerner Index and the two measures of bank insolvency (Z-Score and ZROE). In other 
words, increase in bank competition, which erodes a banks’ ability to raise price above 
marginal cost, increases banks’ risk taking activities resulting in more bank-fragility and 
hence detrimental to financial stability. This finding is similar to findings from other studies 
that support the ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis (Broecker, 1990; Keeley, 1990; Agoraki 
et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2009). Since both the Lerner Index and its square have a 
positive coefficient, the U-sharp hypothesis is rejected. It important to note that adding 
control variables does not change the significance nor the sign of the coefficient on Lerner 
Index.  
With regard to other bank specific control variables, the results show that there is 
significant positive relationship between capital ratio (lower leveraged) and bank 
soundness. This result is similar to findings by Agoraki et al. (2011), Kasman and Kasman 
(2016) and Tabak et al. (2012) and supports the conventional view that higher levels of 
bank capitalization will help to reduce overall bank risk by placing banks in a better 
position to absorb losses resulting from adverse shocks.  This result also renders support 
to stricter capital regulations under Basel II and Basel III  as a safeguard against 
excessive risk taking. Although, the coefficient on bank size has the correct sign it is not 
significant. Finally, the coefficient on diversification indicator is negative and significant. 
This result implies that banks with a diversified source of income are able to withstand 
adverse shocks on other sources of income thereby improving overall bank soundness. 
This result is similar to findings by Kasman and Kasman (2015) but contrary to those by 
De Haan and Poghosyan (2012a, 2012b). 
Further, in addition to bank specific factors economic environment variables are also 
introduced as control variables in the model. Results in table 6 below show that there is 
a positive significant relationship between the level of economic performance and bank 
solvency. This result is consistent with results by Soerdarmono et al. (2013) and it implies 
that an increase in economic activity improves the level of bank soundness due to its 
effects on bank earnings. In addition, the results show that higher copper prices on the 
international market helps to improve the risk bank insolvency. This is consistent with 
findings by Chileshe et al. (2016) which shows that positive shocks to commodity prices, 
especially that of copper, has a significant effect on Zambia’s macroeconomic 
performance. Hence, higher copper prices on international markets could imply an 
improvement in domestic economic activity thereby improving bank earnings. With regard 
to lending rates, the results indicate that there is a significant negative association 
between ZROE but insignificant for Z-Score. This result imply that rising interest rates 
worsens the quality of the loan book due to increase in the size of non-performing loans 
as more borrowers fail to service their loan obligations due higher interest payments. In 
addition, higher interest rates on loans lowers the demand for borrowing thereby reducing 
the interest earnings on new loan issues and consequently resulting in lower bank net 
interest income. Finally, the coefficient on inflation has the expected sign but is 
insignificant.  
In addition to assessing the effect of bank competition on bank soundness, another 
objective of the study was to assess the effect of bank size and capitalization in this 
relationship. Hence, interaction terms between the measure of market power and 
measures of bank insolvency are added to the model. The coefficient of the interaction 
term between the Lerner Index and capitalization is positive and significant while that on 
the interaction of the Lerner Index and size is positive but insignificant. This indicates that 
banks that are better capitalized and have more market power, enjoy even better overall 
bank soundness. Therefore, this implies that collusive banking markets are positive for 
overall bank stability, especially for banks with higher levels of bank capitalization. This 
result is similar to findings by Tabak et al. (2013).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: The effect of competition on overall bank stability 
 Dependent Variable: ZROE/100 Dependent Variable: Z-SCORE/100 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic P-value Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 
-1.130 
 
-1.885 
 
0.060* 
 
-1.340 -2.242 0.025** 
𝑳𝒂𝒈𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 
0.574 16.266 0.000*** 0.654 18.276 0.000*** 
𝑳𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒓 
0.086 
 
2.919 
 
0.004*** 0.120 3.266 0.001*** 
𝑳𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒓𝟐 
0.037 
 
2.419 
 
0.029** 0.077 3.461 0.001*** 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 
0.020 
 
0.435 0.663 0.034 0.791 0.429 
𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
0.852 
 
2.919 0.000*** 1.174 9.472 0.000*** 
𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
-0.040 
 
-1.850 0.065* -0.018 -0.549 0.583 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑮𝑫𝑷) 
0.170 
 
2.087 0.037** 0.128 6.554 0.000*** 
𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 
-0.077 
 
-3.648 0.000*** -0.274 -1.288 0.198 
Inflation 
-0.148 
 
-1.157 0.248 -0.028 -0.219 0.827 
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓) 
0.020 
 
0.634 0.526 0.053 2.278 0.018** 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 ∗ 𝑳𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒓 
0.095 
 
1.348 0.178 0.095 1.299 0.195 
𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑳𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒓 
0.303 
 
6.137 0.000*** 0.572 4.425 0.000*** 
Diagnostics 
 No. Cross-Sections 19 No. Cross-Sections 19 
No. of Observations 769 No. of Observations 769 
Weighted R_Squared 0.579 Weighted R_Squared 0.647 
P-Value 0.000*** P-Value 0.000*** 
 
Haussmann’s Test  
𝐶ℎ𝑖2=41.356  
Haussmann’s Test 
27.165 
P-Value=0.00 0.00 
DW Test Statistic 1.959 1.897 
Source: computations by the author 
Significance Level: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   
 
6.0 Conclusions and policy implications 
The main objective of this paper was to investigate whether bank competition reduces or 
increase credit risk and overall bank stability using a quarterly panel data of Zambian 
banks covering the period Q1 2005 to Q4 2016. In addition, the study investigates the 
effect of bank size, diversification and capitalization on credit risk and bank soundness. 
Thereafter, the role that bank size and capitalization play in the competition-stability nexus 
is evaluated. To achieve the objectives of this study, we estimated a time varying bank 
specific Lerner Index using a translog function. The average Lerner Index estimated over 
the period is 0.28 similar to estimates by Chileshe and Akanbi (2016) as well as that by 
Simpasa (2013).       
Using panel data approaches, results showed that the relationship between credit risk 
and market power is U-sharped. This result supports both ‘concentration-stability’ and 
‘concentration-fragility’ hypothesis. On the contrary, using measures of overall bank 
stability the U-sharp hypothesis is rejected. Specifically, the results indicate that an 
increase in market power increases overall bank soundness. In general, results in this 
study indicate that increasing bank competition reduces financial system stability in line 
with ‘concentration-stability’ hypothesis.  
Further, results showed that bank size and capitalization have significant positive effect 
on both credit risk and overall bank soundness. The positive effect of bank size on bank 
stability is in support of literature, which suggest that larger banks have better risk 
management skills that play a critical role in mitigating credit risk. On the other hand, the 
favorable effect of bank capital on bank stability is in with the argument that banks which 
rely more on shareholder capital to finance their operations are more risk averse 
compared to those who rely on liabilities. Finally, results showed that income 
diversification is critical in improving bank stability. In particular, the results showed that 
lower levels of income diversification is negatively associated with bank stability and 
positively with credit risk. This result confirms the importance of portfolio diversification to 
bank stability. It is expected that a bank with well-diversified portfolio is likely to better 
withstand adverse shocks on earnings from one of its income sources compared to a less 
diversified bank, resulting in more stability.  
With regard to economic environment, results in general showed that economic 
performance has a positive effect on overall bank stability and negatively associated with 
credit risk. These results are expected and in line with literature, which suggests that 
improved economic performance enhances the revenue generation of commercial banks 
through higher demand for loans while at the same time it increases the ability of 
borrowers to service their loans. The favorable effect of higher economic activity on bank 
stability is confirmed by the negative effect of copper prices on the international market 
on credit risk while it has a positive effect on overall bank stability. However, the finds that 
there is positive association between credit risk and negative association with overall 
bank stability. This implies higher interest rates on credit leads to bank instability maybe 
because it increases the probability of default.  
Finally, results indicate that the interaction terms of measures of size and bank capital 
have significant positive coefficient with regard to credit risk and overall bank stability. 
These results imply that larger and well-capitalized banks with market power are more 
stable than smaller undercapitalized ones.  
A number policy implications can be drawn from the results of this study. First, the 
favorable effect of market power on bank stability implies that there is need for supervisory 
authorities in Zambia and similar countries to be wary of rushing to increase competition 
in the sector as it may lead to increased risk taking among the banks. In addition, results 
suggests that it would be prudent for authorities to propose merger of smaller banks to 
enhance their market power and consequently their stability. Second, implementing 
stringent capital regulations under the Basel II and Basel III especially is critical for further 
enhancing financial stability. Third, it would be prudent for regulatory authorities to 
introduce income diversification thresholds for commercial banks aimed at safeguarding 
banks against adverse shocks on some income sources. Finally, it would be prudent for 
authorities to enhance monitoring of commercial banks during periods of economic 
downturns.  
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